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A series of high-profile critiques of Bayesian models of cognition have recently
sparked controversy. These critiques question the contribution of rational, normative
considerations in the study of cognition. The present article takes central claims from
these critiques and evaluates them in light of specific models. Closer consideration of
actual examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenomena allows one to
defuse these critiques showing that they cannot be sustained across the diversity of
applications of the Bayesian framework for cognitive modeling. More generally, there is
nothing in the Bayesian framework that would inherently give rise to the deficits that these
critiques perceive, suggesting they have been framed at the wrong level of generality.
At the same time, the examples are used to demonstrate the different ways in which
consideration of rationality uniquely benefits both theory and practice in the study of
cognition.
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INTRODUCTION
The last two decades of cognitive science have seen a bit of a rev-
olution: probabilistic models of cognition, in particular, Bayesian
models have not only steadily increased in volume, but have come
to grab a large market share in those outlets, such as Psychological
Review, that focus on psychological “theory.” These trends are
manifest not just in a wealth of reviews (e.g., Chater et al., 2006,
2010) and bibliometric statistics, but, last but not least, in the
fact that Bayesian models have recently prompted a number of
high-profile critiques (e.g., Elqayam and Evans, 2011; Jones and
Love, 2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012a,b). A pre-requisite to cri-
tique is getting noticed in the first place, and, given that these
critiques concern formal, mathematical models of cognition, that
is no mean feat.
So these critiques may plausibly be taken to signal a moment
of arrival in the development of the paradigm, particularly given
that they were written for a general audience, not just for spe-
cialists within the discipline. At the same time, it seems likely
that these critiques provide insight that research would be well-
advised to heed. In light of this, the present paper scrutinizes these
recent critiques with a view to identifying the key implications
they present for future work.
FUNDAMENTAL CRITIQUES
Three sets of criticisms have recently been aimed at Bayesian
models of cognition: the target article in Behavioral and Brain
Sciences by Jones and Love (2011) raising the specter of “Bayesian
fundamentalism,” Bowers and Davis article in Psychological
Bulletin (2012) on “Bayesian just-so stories” and, from an even
broader perspective, Elqayam and Evans (2011) recommendation
to abandon a central role for normative models in the study of the
cognition. While there is some overlap between these critiques,
each makes distinct points. Each is also a lengthy article in its own
right, containing a wealth of observations and claims. However,
for the purposes of this article, four main claims of interest will
be highlighted and addressed for each.
JONES AND LOVE (2011)
Jones and Love find that rational Bayesian models are (1) sig-
nificantly unconstrained, because they are generally uninformed
by either process-level data or environmental measurement.
Furthermore, (2) the psychological implications of most Bayesian
models are also unclear (last but not least because there is little
contact with mechanism or process). The retreat to the level of
abstraction away from process at which Bayesian models are typ-
ically phrased is not perceived to be of intrinsic interest because
(3) Bayesian inference itself is conceptually trivial (Bayes’ theorem
is just a simple “vote counting”). And finally, (4) many Bayesian
models simply recapitulate existing (mechanistic level) theories.
BOWERS AND DAVIS (2012A,B)
Here it is maintained that (1) flexibility with priors, likelihoods,
and utility functions frequently makes models unfalsifiable, while
(2) Bayesian theories are also rarely better at predicting data
than alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian ones. In general,
for understanding cognition and building insightful models of
cognitive processes, (3) constraints other than rational analysis
are more important. As a consequence, (4) psychology and neu-
roscience now abound with Bayesian “just so” stories, that is,
mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain
almost any behavior as optimal.
ELQAYAM AND EVANS (2011)
The focus of Elqayam and Evan’s critique, finally, is more general
in its target than just Bayesian modeling, affecting also the use of
decision-theory and logic as other putative norms of rationality.
The central point in Elqayam and Evan’s paper is (1) a critique
of what they call “normativism”: the idea that human thinking
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reflects a normative system against which it should be mea-
sured and judged. Normativism is conceptually dubious because
it invites fallacious is-to-ought and ought-to-is inferences (2). At
the same time, little can be gained from normativism that can-
not be achieved by descriptivist computational-level analysis (3).
As a consequence, Elqayam and Evans believe that (4) theories
of higher mental processing would be better off if freed from
normative considerations.
Each of these articles has already seen extensive counter-
critique, last but not least the open peer commentaries that are
an integral part of the journal format for two of these three arti-
cles (and for the third, Bowers and Davis, 2012a,b), see the reply
in the same journal by Griffiths et al., 2012). It is the contention
of the present paper, however, that there are still things to be said
on this topic, and that some things that have been said deserve
to be said again and become clearer or more compelling when
put together in a single overall argument. First and foremost, it
is the contention of this paper that closer consideration of actual
examples of Bayesian treatments of different cognitive phenom-
ena allows one to defuse the above critiques. Specifically, it will
be argued that one of the main reasons the critiques go amiss
is that they have been phrased at the wrong level of generality.
More detailed consideration of specific examples, however, is not
something the restrictive format of open peer commentary readily
supports.
THE DIVERSITY OF BAYESIAN MODELING
One of the tensions in all three critiques is that, while it is likely
they have been motivated by particular applications, they are
pitched as general critiques of a paradigm. This is striking because
Bayesian probability itself is, in first instance, a formalism, that
is, a “language.” As such, it affords many and diverse applica-
tions. How then could such a diverse set of applications suffer
from common problems? For one, it could do so coincidentally:
researchers who avail themselves of this language happen to, by
and large, be researchers who are comparatively poor at the task of
model-building. For example, they may fail to appreciate funda-
mental criteria of “goodness” for a model that a field has managed
to identify. The root cause, in this case, is effectively sociological.
There is nothing within the formalism itself that makes necessary
the deficits observed, and, in the hands of others, these limita-
tions could easily be rectified. The second possibility is that there
is some deeper limiting factor in the formalism that is responsi-
ble for the perceived limitations. In this latter case, the formalism
itself is indeed, at least partly, to blame. Both cases would merit
critique, but the nature of that critique, in order to be appropri-
ate and hence constructive, would have to be very different. The
only way to distinguish between these two possibilities is to con-
sider specific examples. Limitations of the formalism itself should
emerge as common aspects of all examples considered.
For these purposes it is important to consider a broad range
of examples. Figure 1 contains a set of such examples, chosen
with diversity in mind. The list contains both some of the most
famous and influential Bayesian modeling (e.g., Anderson, 1991;
Oaksford and Chater, 1994) and other examples, which, by com-
parison, are completely obscure (e.g., Harris and Hahn, 2009).
The examples vary also in the cognitive domain to which the
FIGURE 1 | The figure presents examples of applications of Bayesian
modeling. The examples, discussed in the text, reflect both different types
of application in terms of the aspect of the cognitive system modeled, and
the theoretical and methodological role accorded to Bayesian inference as a
result.
model is applied, ranging from judgment through reasoning and
argumentation to categorization and language acquisition.
In fact, these differences in domain give rise to an infor-
mal ordering within the Figure: the green-blue dimension1. This
dimension may, in first instance, be taken to reflect the extent to
which the underlying cognitive task inherently involves inference,
and more specifically, probabilistic inference.
To illustrate: On the far right hand end of the “blue spectrum,”
the task participants face in Harris and Hahn’s (2009) studies of
evidential coherence is that of evaluating, from the perspective of
the police, the potential location of a body given the testimony
of (less than perfectly reliable) multiple witnesses. Not only is
this inherently an inferential task involving uncertainty, but par-
ticipants are specifically asked to evaluate a question about ‘how
likely it is’ that the body lies within a particular area on a map.
By contrast, at the green end, Anderson’s (1991) famous ratio-
nal model of unsupervised categorization addresses the task of
imposing categories on unlabeled instances, that is, partition-
ing a set of objects into distinct classes of object. This need
not be viewed as an inference task at all. Furthermore, even
if the task is to be construed as one involving inference, there
is a wealth of different choices concerning what that inference
may be about. Ultimate answers to the fundamental question of
what unsupervised categorization does and what it is for rest on
extremely difficult questions about the relationship betweenmind
and world (e.g., the extent to which we “discover” categories in
the world or instead impose them) and the role of categories in
language and thought.
In fact, rival accounts of unsupervised categorization which
assume that classification proceeds on the basis of inter-item
similarity, for example, may assume that such similarities reflect
deep facts about the environment (or, human perceptions thereof,
given that “similarity” is a subjective, not an objective relation
between objects, see e.g., Hahn and Chater, 1997), or they may
simply take as their point of departure that human categorization
seems sensitive to similarity.
1Both are pleasing colors in keeping with the fact that the dimension does not
reflect value.
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Anderson’s (1991) model is based on the idea that categoriza-
tion reflects the goal of optimally predicting the unseen features
of objects, that is, we wish to be able to predict Pi(j|Fn), the prob-
ability that (as yet unseen) dimension i of the object possesses the
value j, given the feature structure Fn observed so far. Categories
are formed to assist this goal. Hence, objects are assigned to cat-
egories in such a way as to make the feature structures of those
objects most probable. As a Bayesian model, the rational model
assigns a new object to the most probable category k given the
features observed, P(k|F). In so doing, the model may choose to
create an entirely new category for that item.
The fact that the two examples, Harris and Hahn’s study of
coherence, and Anderson’s rational model, fall on opposite ends
of the spectrum with regard to the extent to which the task under
investigation is necessarily construed as involving probabilistic
inference has immediate implications for the role of rational,
Bayesian inference in each case.
Where the task is uncontroversially construed as an inferen-
tial one, the mapping between task and formalism is more or less
direct. Where it is not, the probabilistic construal is merely one
of many possible, equally plausible, task decompositions. This
has direct consequences for the “normative” or “rational” status
bestowed by Bayesian inference. While it is the case that Bayesian
probabilistic inference has a privileged status that makes its use
“rational” or “optimal” in certain well-defined senses (more on
this in a moment), this normativity or rationality only goes as far
as the inference itself. If the task may plausibly be construed as
not involving inference in the first place, then the resultant model
as a whole is neither inherently more “normative” or “rational”
than any other.
Associated with the difference in role for Bayesian inference
at the two ends of the green-blue spectrum are other differences.
In Harris and Hahn’s (2009) study prior probabilities are objec-
tively defined within the task. There is nothing to “choose” here
by the modeler, and there are no free parameters. In the case of
Anderson’s rational model, by contrast, model behavior is criti-
cally dependent on prior probabilities for category membership.
Anderson (1991) specifies this prior in the following way:
p(k) = cnk
(1 − c) + cn (1)
where nk is the number of objects assigned to category k thus far,
n is the total number of classified objects and c is the so-called
“coupling parameter.” This parameter governs the probability that
a new instance will receive an entirely new label, P(0):
p(0) = 1 − c
(1 − c) + cn (2)
In other words, the coupling parameter determines how readily
new categories will be formed: for high values of the coupling
parameter, larger clusters are favored by the prior, whereas for low
values the model will favor greater numbers of smaller categories.
Model behavior thus varies dramatically as a function of c.
Furthermore, the combinatorial explosion concerning the
number of possible partitions of even fairly small sets of to-
be-classified objects means that Anderson’s model must rely on
approximation to the optimal Bayesian estimates. Alternative
approximation algorithms to Anderson’s are possible (e.g., Gibb’s
sampling, see Geman and Geman, 1984) or particle filters (see
e.g., Doucet et al., 2001), and, as Sanborn et al. (2010) demon-
strate, will give rise to differences in model predictions.
This makes it fuzzier what the rational model actually is, and
makes the model harder to test empirically. However, contrary to
concerns about Bayesian models articulated by Bowers and Davis
(2012a,b) there is no sense in which the rational model is unfalsi-
fiable. One can readily evaluate model predictions across values
of the coupling parameter and contrast those predictions with
human behavior (as in Sanborn et al., 2010) and in that way
compare the rational model with competing formal models of
unsupervised categorization (as in Pothos et al., 2011), and one
can do this for different approximation algorithms.
Needless to say, in the case that other models perform better
on such tests (as Pothos et al., indeed find them to do), no one
would take that to indicate that participants’ views on classifica-
tion are “irrational.” Because there are so many ways the goals
of categorization can be construed, the model does not prescribe
what people should do in any strong sense. Deviating from it is
not an “error” in the same way that prominent inferential fail-
ures in the judgment and decision-making literature (such as the
conjunction fallacy, Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) are viewed as
errors—an issue we return to below.
Concerning the critical challenge surrounding model falsifia-
bility it seems important to distinguish vague predictions from
model flexibility. Vagueness means that it is unclear exactly what
predictions are, and what empirical evidence might or might not
meet them. Flexibility, by contrast, means that a model or theory
can change its predictions depending on parameterization; given
a particular set of parameters, however, predictions are specific.
The rational model not only has an important free parameter,
but due to the nature of its approximation algorithm, also has
stochastic variation in its model output; however, by averaging
over model runs, specific predictions can be derived, and—as has
been demonstrated empirically (see e.g., Pothos et al., 2011)—the
model can readily be compared both with human data and with
other models.
Beyond pointing out that even a flexible model such as
Anderson’s rational model admits falsification it is hard to know
how to address Bowers and Davis claims that Bayesian models
may frequently be unfalsifiable given their flexibility with priors,
liklihoods and utility functions. It seems hard to see that Bayesian
models are more flexible than other mathematical models that
admit of parameterization. They are certainly not inherentlymore
flexible, because in many contexts (certainly toward the “blue
end” of Figure 1), Bayesian models of the task can and have been
applied (and compared with human performance) without free
parameters at all, because parameters such as priors or likeli-
hoods are derived from participants estimates or because they
are taken directly from environmental quantities and the model
itself consists simply of Bayes theorem. In addition to the Harris
and Hahn (2009) paper, other examples here include Harris
et al.’s (2012) study on argumentation, and the extensive body of
research within the 1960’s that examined experimentally human
belief revision using simple devices such as colored pokerchips
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drawn from bags of varying chip composition (see e.g., Peterson
and Beach, 1967; Edwards, 1968). At the very least, these exam-
ples make clear that the formalism itself does not impose any
particular degree of flexibility.
Other examples along the green-blue dimension fit also with
the first two examples of Anderson (1991) on the one hand, and
Harris and Hahn (2009) on the other. Perfors et al. (2011) simula-
tions are aimed at addressing fundamental questions in language
acquisition concerning so-called poverty of stimulus arguments,
that is, arguments that seek to argue that certain aspects of
language, though developmentally acquired, cannot be learned,
because there is insufficient information in the linguistic input
to the child (for a review and references see also e.g., Hahn and
Oaksford, 2008). Perfors et al. like many researchers concerned
with these questions before them (see e.g., Chomsky, 1957, 1986;
Gold, 1967; Wharton, 1974) assume that the task at hand is to
infer a grammar, from which the grammatical sentences of the
language can be generated. However, whether this is an appropri-
ate way to conceive of language acquisition is in itself a matter of
debate. Other researchers have argued that the goal of acquisition
is to learn form-meaningmappings (e.g., Bates andMacWhinney,
1989) or to learn procedures for comprehension and production
(Seidenberg andMacDonald, 1999). On such views, there need be
no role at all in language for a grammar as traditionally conceived.
The role of Bayesian inference in Perfors et al.’s study is thus to
provide an elegant, well-defined, and well-understood modeling
tool. The point is not an account of what children should do.
Over at the “blue end” of Figure 1, however, such normative
concerns are integral to Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) account
of Wason’s selection task, a paper that, like Anderson’s rational
model, is a cornerstone of Bayesian modeling. Wason’s classic
(1968) study shows participants deviating from a falsificationist
strategy when asked to select information to test a rule. While fal-
sification was advocated as an ideal strategy for science by Popper
(1959), it is not ideal in general, that is, independently of the
specific hypotheses and nature of the environment as shown, for
example, by Klayman and Ha (1989). And indeed, philosophers
of science have not only noted that falsificationism does not cap-
ture the actual conduct of science (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1976),
but have moved away from it as an ideal strategy in more recent
work that adopts a Bayesian, normative perspective on scien-
tific inference (e.g., Earman, 1992; Howson and Urbach, 1993).
Oaksford and Chater (1994) seek to show that under certain sim-
ple assumptions about the structure of the environment, and cer-
tain assumptions about reasonable priors, participants’ responses
on the selection task are well-understood as an approximation to
optimal data selection.
In general, Oaksford and Chater’s treatment of conditional
reasoning involves a twofold argument. On the one hand, they
argue that the utility of classical logic in the context of every-
day reasoning is extremely limited (see e.g., Oaksford and Chater,
1991); probability theory, by contrast, provides a natural formal-
ism for reasoning under uncertainty. On the other hand, as they
seek to demonstrate, seeming patterns of deviation in human
responding on what have traditionally been conceived of as logi-
cal reasoning tasks, are well-captured under the assumption that
participants view the seemingly deductive inference task as a
probabilistic inference task.
This work is naturally situated toward the “blue end” as it
is concerned with what are inference tasks by design. There is
room for debate here on a normative level about the mapping
between probability theory and the task; in particular there has
been considerable philosophical debate about the appropriate for-
malization of the natural language condition “if . . . then” (see
e.g., Edgington, 1995; Evans and Over, 2004), so the normative
claims do not simply have to be accepted at face value. But they
are integral to the overall aims of the project. At the same time,
there is a descriptive component: the claim that actual partici-
pant responding is well-understood as an approximation of this
normative construal. This descriptive claim may be empirically
challenged, both by seeking to provide evidence of systematic
deviation between model and observed behavior, and by posit-
ing alternative explanations of behavior that rest on functionally
different interpretations (by participants) of the task.
Lively empirical debate has thus ensued (see e.g., the open
peer commentary on Oaksford and Chater, 2009). This in itself
testifies against claims about lack of falsifiability, but it is also
important to note here that Oaksford and Chater’s work has, in
fact, brought a new level of specificity to behavioral prediction
in the context of logical reasoning (see also Hahn, 2009 for
discussion of this point). Prior to Oaksford and Chater’s work,
data in the psychology of logical reasoning were a collection
of qualitative phenoma (“context effects,” “supression effects”
etc.). Since their seminal (1994) paper, empirical work in the
psychology of reasoning frequently involves evaluation of detailed
quantitative predictions. This was first seen in Oaksford and
Chater’s probabilistic approach, and it is “rival approaches” that
have followed in this (see e.g., Schroyens and Schaeken, 2003;
Oberauer, 2006; Klauer et al., 2007).
This example speaks to a whole range of separate points in
the above critiques of Bayesian models: namely, the shift to more
detailed, quantitative predictions provides a ready example where
Bayesian models do not simply recapitulate existing mechanism
level theories [Jones and Love (4) above]; moreover, it provides
an example where a Bayesian model has been “better at predicting
data than simpler (non-Bayesian) alternatives” [see, Bowers and
Davis, (2) above]; and it makes questionable the claim that “nor-
mativism” has hampered the development of high-level cognition
so that we would be better off without it [Elqayam and Evans, (3
and 4)], and that constraints other than rational analysis are more
important [Bowers and Davis (3)].
It is precisely the fact that the Bayesian framework enables
quantitative prediction that enabled Oaksford and Chater’s work
to bring about this change in specificity of prediction within the
psychology of reasoning, and their choice of formalismwas driven
by normative considerations. Other quantitativemodels may have
followed subsequently, but the impulse for the shift came from the
use of Bayesian modeling.
It is worth emphasis also that the reasoning tasks addressed in
Oaksford and Chater’s work are classic examples of “high-level
cognition” which Fodor (1983) considered to be “central process-
ing,” and hence an aspect of cognition for which we would never
have detailed theories and predictions. That the field of reasoning
can capture subtle changes in behavior in response to changes in
the content of high-level, verbal experimental materials in such
detail is thus, in and of itself, a remarkable success.
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Moreover, Oaksford and Chater’s treatment of selection task
and logical reasoning (see also on syllogistic reasoning, Chater
and Oaksford, 1999) are not alone here. Arguably, this specificity
has been spreading through other aspects of human reasoning
as well (see also e.g., Kemp and Tenenbaum, 2009). Hahn and
Oaksford’s work on informal argument fallacies are a further
case in point (e.g., Hahn and Oaksford, 2007). Fallacies, or argu-
ments that seem correct but aren’t, pervade everyday informal
argument. Catalogs of argumentation fallacies (also known as rea-
soning fallacies) originate with Aristotle and have been of concern
to philosophers, logicians, and argumentation theorists to this
day, though they have engendered only small amounts of psycho-
logical research in the past (e.g., Neuman and Weitzman, 2003).
The longstanding goal of fallacies research has been to provide
a comprehensive, formal treatment that can explain exactly why
they are “bad” arguments. Hahn and Oaksford (2007) show how
classic fallacies, such as the argument from ignorance (“ghosts
exist, because nobody has proven that they don’t”), or circular
arguments (“God exists, because the Bible says so and the Bible
is the word of God”) can be given a formal Bayesian treatment
that distinguishes appropriately weak examples of these argument
forms from ones that seem intuitively acceptable. More generally,
it provides explanations of widespread intuition that arguments
from ignorance or circular arguments are frequently weak: anal-
ysis across the range of possible underlying probabilities that
these arguments may involve demonstrates how they are typically
weaker than other types of arguments in everyday life (for details
see Hahn and Oaksford, 2007).
This is in part an explicitly normative project, aimed at
addressing long standing theoretical questions about the fallacies,
but also more general questions about the extent to which there
can be “norms” for argument quality that allow us to determine
whether an argument should or should not convince.
At the same time, the ability to measure argument quality
through use of the Bayesian, probabilistic framework allows one
to generate both qualitative and quantitative predictions against
which people’s judgments of everyday arguments can be com-
pared. Such comparisons have been conducted, not just in the
context of the fallacies, but in the context of other arguments as
well (e.g., Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Hahn et al., 2009; Corner
et al., 2011; Harris et al., 2012).
The predictions made in these contexts are not only novel,
there is, in many of the cases examined, simply no alternative
framework that would allow one to make predictions about the
materials examined2. That is, the theoretical questions that can be
addressed are new. But there are not just new questions about how
people evaluate particular argument forms which have now been
formalized. The formal framework provides a methodological
tool that allows one to examine a whole host of issues concern-
ing argumentation that are not possible without it. For example,
as Corner and Hahn (2009) note, much of the communication
to the public of socio-scientific issues of broad concern such
as climate change, genetically modified foods, nanotechnology
2This is, of course, not to say that there has been no empirical work on
other aspects of the fallacies or on argumentation more generally (for a recent
overview see, Hahn and Oaksford, 2012).
and so on, involves brief summaries of arguments. How peo-
ple evaluate such arguments is thus a central practical concern
across a broad range of issues requiring large-scale action. A
normative standard for measuring argument quality, and with
that participants’ evaluation of arguments, provides a tool for
probing whether the way people think about issues such as cli-
mate change (for example with respect to conflicting testimony,
see e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 2013) differs from the way they
reason in other evidential contexts. Such comparisons become
possible despite the differences in argument content (and hence
attendant differences in people’s prior beliefs and the actual
diagnosticity of the evidence) because responses to arguments
from different domains can be compared via the normative stan-
dard: in other words, one can ask whether people’s reasoning is
more or less in line with normative prescriptions across different
domains.
Far from re-capitulating the predictions of other, simpler, or
more process-oriented models, then, this argumentation work
has created a wealth of opportunity for empirical inquiry. Against
the claim that other computational level theories might be as
successful (or even more successful) if the limiting emphasis
on normative considerations were abandoned stands the simple
fact that no other computational level theory presently exists in
this particular case. Given the fact that the development of the
computational level theory was driven explicitly by normative
considerations, it would also seem perverse to consider such con-
siderations a block to progress [cf. Elqayam and Evans (4)], at
least in this context.
Similarly, the argumentation example is at odds with the per-
ception that “other kinds of constraints” (e.g., neural constraints)
are, typically, more powerful than rational or normative consid-
erations. And this seems indicative of “the blue end” of Figure 1
more generally. For example, it is a characteristic of Oaksford and
Chater’s work in the psychology of reasoning that it is precisely
not concerned with process or implementation. Greater predic-
tive power with regard to human behavior (i.e., the initial shift
from qualitative to quantitative prediction) was achieved in their
work despite moving to a higher level of abstraction. Moreover,
the argumentation example may lead one to suspect that it is not
despite that retreat to a higher level of abstraction but rather pre-
cisely because of it, that detailed quantitative predictions suddenly
become possible.
What Bayesian modeling captures in this context is relation-
ships between information states. If human reasoning and infer-
ence about the world is to have any point at all, it must be sensitive
to the actual content of what is under consideration. Where
evidential and inferential relationships are at stake, information
content is the first and primary consideration. It is thus no coin-
cidence that a probabilistic framework (which is about content)
does a better job of predicting human behavior than the limited
structural considerations of classical logic, for example. Of course,
it is clear that reasoning will also be influenced by themechanisms
through which it is carried out. However, were these mechanisms
to provide greater constraints on, say argument evaluation, than
the actual information content of the argument and the relation-
ship of that content to other beliefs, then thesemechanisms would
necessarily be extremely restricted inferential devices. Our best
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evidence concerning higher level-cognition suggests that this is
not what human thought is like3.
For sure, there are deviations from “normative responding”
in any reasoning or evidence evaluation context that has been
examined, but the deviations would have to outweigh the cor-
respondence to provide greater, more fundamental, and more
useful initial constraints. Otherwise, starting from considerations
of normative responding will provide the single biggest gain in
predictive accuracy. Moreover, via inspection of systematic devi-
ations, it likely provides one of the most powerful routes to
identifying where mechanism constraints must be playing a role,
and thus to what those mechanisms might be.
WHY NORMATIVE, WHY RATIONAL?
For many applications of the Bayesian framework the appeal to
its normative status is integral. What then does that status rest
on, and what kind of rationality or optimality can it consequently
bestow?
In fact, there are multiple, independent routes to establishing
a normative basis for Bayesian inference (see e.g., Corner and
Hahn, 2013 for detailed discussion both of the general issue of
normativity and Bayesian inference specifically). Lack of aware-
ness of these distinct possibilities makes it easy to underestimate
both the ways in which Bayesian inference may be perceived
to provide a norm, that is a prescription of how one ought to
behave, and to over-estimate how readily alternatives may make
a rival claim. At the same time, lack of care in considering exactly
what the normative status pertains to runs the risk of overblown
normative claims for Bayesian models.
Of the different routes for claiming a normative basis for the
Bayesian framework, the Dutch Book argument is the most well-
known. A Dutch Book is a combination of bets that can be shown
to entail a sure loss. In other words, engaging in a combination of
bets that constitute a Dutch Book means necessarily incurring a
loss, regardless of how the world turns out. Moreover, this loss is
immediate, arising the moment the bet is resolved, not just in the
long run (as incorrectly stated in Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013).
The Dutch Book argument provides an instrumental argu-
ment for assigning degrees of beliefs in accordance with the
probability calculus based on the minimal assumption that incur-
ring a sure loss would be undesirable. Specifically, the argument
connects degrees of belief to a (theoretical) willingness to bet by
assuming that a person with degree of belief P in a proposition
a would be willing to pay up to £P to bet on a. The Dutch Book
Theorem states that if a set of betting prices violates the probabil-
ity calculus, then there is a Dutch Book consisting of bets at these
prices, that is, a combination of bets that guarantees a sure loss.
Being in possession of degrees of belief that violate the probability
calculus makes possible Dutch Books and conversely, conformity
with the calculus provides immunity from Dutch Books (the
so-called converse Dutch book theorem, see e.g., Hajek, 2008).
3Even for a very restricted inferential device, however, there must be con-
straints on how its outputs “cohere” with those of other components of the
systems if the system is to function effectively. This need for coherence once
again brings a focus on information content and with it, a role for Bayesian
inference (see Griffiths et al., 2012).
Bayesian inference (and Bayesian modeling), however, is not
just characterized by assignment of probabilities in line with the
axioms of probability theory, but also by the use of Bayesian con-
ditionalization for belief revision. That is, Bayes’ theorem (which
itself follows from the axioms of the probability calculus) is used
as an update rule to accommodate new evidence. Analogous,
so-called diachronic Dutch book arguments exist for Bayesian
conditionalization (see Teller, 1973; and for the converse Dutch
book argument, Skyrms, 1993).
To illustrate the nature of Dutch Book arguments with a
famous example: Assigning to the conjunction of two events or
claims a higher probability (or degree of belief) than is assigned to
the less probable of the two—the so-called conjunction fallacy—
is, in effect, a logical error. The conjunction of two events, A and
B, cannot be true without each of the events being true also, and
the event “A and B” cannot occur without the event A and the
event B occurring as well. Hence they cannot be less probable than
the conjunction; failing to realize this makes one Dutch-bookable,
as exemplified in Table 1 (see also Newell et al., 2007 for a con-
crete numerical example). For example, believing it to be more
probable that Linda is a bankteller and a feminist, than that she
is a feminist (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) means that a combi-
nation of bets could be offered which, if accepted, would imply a
sure loss.
The example of the conjunction fallacy is chosen here, in
part, because it has been argued recently within the cognitive
literature that quantum probability may provide a more appro-
priate framework for modeling human cognition than classical
probability (e.g., Pothos and Busemeyer, 2009; Busemeyer et al.,
2011). This not only involves the use of quantum probabil-
ity as a descriptive tool, but its proponents have specifically
asked about its normative or rational status (see e.g., Busemeyer
and Bruza, 2012; Pothos and Busemeyer, 2013, 2014). For the
conjunction fallacy, the ability to model what, from the per-
spective of classical logic and probability, are viewed as “errors”
has been presented as one of the key modeling “successes”
within the quantum framework (but see for challenges to its
descriptive adequacy e.g., Tentori and Crupi, 2013). However,
adherence to quantum probability in this way licenses the con-
junction fallacy, and hence, is Dutch-bookable4 . The Dutch
book illustrates why this has traditionally been viewed as a
mistake.
Unsurprisingly, in seeking to make their case for “quantum
rationality,” Busemeyer and colleague are skeptical about Dutch
book arguments and the extent to which they justify a normative
status for classical probability. In particular, they highlight a sup-
posed practical limitation of Dutch Book justification: “Avoiding
a Dutch book requires expected value maximization, rather than
expected utility maximization, that is, the decision maker is
constrained to use objective values rather than personal utili-
ties, when choosing between bets. However, decision theorists
generally reject the assumption of objective value maximization
and instead allow for subjective utility functions (Savage, 1954).
4In this application of quantum probability to a macro-level entity such as
Linda the feminist bankteller. Needless to say, this is not the standard domain
of application for the formalism.
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Table 1 | Dutch book arguments.
The typical way to present Dutch Books is by presenting propositions, associated betting odds, and outcomes in a table. The left most example in the
table below illustrates a bet on a for an agent who buys a bet with stake 1$ (i.e., 1$ is the amount won if a is true) for the price q(a) (q as in betting
“quotient”); by assumption, the agent’s betting quotient is determined by her degree of belief that a is true. The table is read in the following way: in the
case where a turns out to be true, the agent receives 1$ as a payout, but has paid q(a) for the bet, so her net payoff is 1$ - q(a). If a turns out to be false,
there is no payout, and the agent has simply lost the money she paid for the bet. She will make a profit if a turns out to be true and she has paid less
than 1$ for the bet (i.e., q(a) < 1), and a loss otherwise.
a Net payoff a b Net payoff
True $1 - q(a) True True 1 −q(a, b) q(b)−1
False −q(a) True False −q(a,b) q(b)
False True −q(a,b) q(b)−1
False False −q(a,b) q(b)
The right hand of the table shows a Dutch Book for the conjunction fallacy. Here, a and b represent two claims, with b representing the less probable of
the two. Our agent will sell for price q(b) a bet that pays out 1$ if b turns out to be true, and pay out 0 if it is false. Our agent will also buy for price q(a,b)
a bet that pays out 1$ if the conjunction (a,b) is true and 0 otherwise. Because our agent commits the conjunction fallacy q(a,b) is greater than q(b).
In each row, the net payoff is negative, so whatever the truth or falsity of a and b, our agent makes a loss. This can be read off directly for rows 2–4
(quantities in bold are “losses,” quantities in plain font are “gains”). In the case of row 1, where both a and b are true, our agent wins 1$ because the
conjunction is true. From this 1$, the price paid for the bet needs to be deducted to calculate net gain. Against this is then set the loss the agent makes
by paying out on the win for b. This loss necessarily exceeds the gains. (For two positive numbers x and y, if x > y, then 1−x < 1 − y ; also,
y−1 = −(1−y ); because q(ab) > q(b) by definition, the gain 1−q(ab) must be smaller than the loss q(b)−1, meaning a net loss overall).
This is essential, for example, in order to take into account
the observed risk aversion in human decisions (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). When maximizing subjective expected utility, CP
[insertion: CP = Classical Probability] reasoning can fall prey to
Dutch book problems (Wakker, 2010)” (Pothos and Busemeyer,
2013, p. 270).
This argument (largely repeated in Pothos and Busemeyer,
2014) conflates two separate issues: whether or not utilities are
“subjective” and whether or not an agent is “risk averse.” On
the issue of subjective utilities and Dutch books, Pothos and
Busemeyer are wrong: The Dutch Book argument could equally
be run over subjective utilities (see e.g., Hajek, 2008). In gen-
eral, the so-called representation theorems for expected utility5
are typically defined over preferences- that is subjective valu-
ations (see e.g., Karni, 2014). These representation theorems
establish that as long as an agent’s preferences respect certain
fundamental axioms an expected utility representation of those
preferences (which casts them as a combination of probability
and utility) is guaranteed. Hence economists long assumed that
people’s choices might be well-described as “maximizing subjec-
tive expected utility.” In their descriptive application of expected
utility theory, they have also sought to allow for the fact that
people are frequently “risk averse”: many might, for example
prefer 10$ for sure, over a 50/50 chance of receiving either 30$
or 0$, even though the expected value of the latter option is
higher (namely 15$) and picking it will lead to greater gains on
average.
Within Expected Utility Theory (EUT) risk aversion can be
modeled by assuming that people have non-linear, concave utility
functions whereby twice as much money becomes less than twice
5These are themselves often used as justifications for a normative basis of
probability, see e.g., Armendt (1993).
as “good”6. This does not mean that people should have non-linear
utility functions and be risk averse, however. From the perspective
of EUT, risk aversion costs money, and the degree to which the
concave utility function diverges from a risk neutral, linear, util-
ity function captures an agent’s “risk premium,” that is, the price
an agent is willing to pay in exchange for certainty over and above
expectedmonetary value. Given that risk aversion implies loss rel-
ative to expected value the possibility of Dutch Books under risk
aversion seems unremarkable and simply highlights, in a different
way, the cost of risk aversion. Risk aversion as a descriptive fact
about human preferences does not make a Dutch Book a “good
thing”; rather there may be practical contexts in which the price
of susceptibility to Dutch Books may be a price an agent is willing
to pay in exchange for some greater good. It is thus unclear how
risk aversion undermines the Dutch Book argument.
Pothos and Busemeyer’s argument is in many ways illustrative
of the lively debate about Dutch book arguments. Such debate
has focussed to a good extent on how literally one may interpret
them and thus how far exactly is their normative reach (for exten-
sive reviews see e.g., Hajek, 2008; for summaries of the main lines
of argument see e.g., Corner and Hahn, 2013): for example, one
can also avoid a particular Dutch book simply by refusing to bet
(though we cannot refuse to bet against nature in general, i.e.,
we are forced in daily life to make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty).
Such arguments do not detract from the fact that the existence
of a Dutch book highlights a defect of sorts in a set of proba-
bilities or degrees of belief (e.g., the failure to recognize that if
the conjunction is true, each of the conjuncts is necessarily true
also). And the defect highlighted (via the theoretical “sure loss”)
6Though whether this is descriptively adequate seems doubtful, see e.g., Rabin
and Thaler (2001).
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is one that obtains regardless of the way the world is, that is, what
actually turns out to be true or false.
Normative justification for Bayesian probability can thus also
be derived from considerations of accuracy (examples of this are
Rosenkrantz, 1992; Joyce, 1998; Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010a,b).
Accuracy-based justifications involve the use of a scoring rule to
measure the accuracy of probabilistic forecasts as used, for exam-
ple, in meteorology, (e.g., Winkler and Murphy, 1968). Scoring
rules allow one to assign credit for correct predictions, and penal-
ties for incorrect ones. Overall accuracy is then reflected in the
total score. Rosenkrantz (1992) shows that updating by Bayes’
rule maximizes the expected score after sampling; in other words,
other updating rules will be less efficient in the sense that they
will require larger samples, on average, to be as accurate. This
holds for any way of measuring accuracy that involves a so-called
“proper scoring rule,” that is, a scoring rule which will yield high-
est scores when agents report “honestly” their actual degrees of
belief (that is, there is no incentive for agents to, for example,
“hedge their bets” by reporting more conservative estimates than
they believe). Furthermore, this optimality of Bayesian condi-
tionalization with respect to maximizing accuracy holds not just
for “interest-free inquiry,” but also holds where actions depen-
dent on our beliefs about the world are at stake: using Bayesian
conditionalization to update our beliefs upon having sampled
evidence maximizes expected utility (Brown, 1976; Rosenkrantz,
1992). Finally, Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) demonstrate that
for a common measure of accuracy (the Brier score, Brier, 1950),
Bayesianism (i.e., assignment of probabilities in accordance with
the probability axioms and updating via Bayes’ rule) follows
from the simple premise that an agent ought to approximate the
truth, and hence seek to minimize inaccuracy. Being Bayesian
will minimize inaccuracy of the agent’s beliefs across all “possible
worlds” the agent is conceptually able to distinguish and hence, in
principle, to entertain!7
These results provide a normative justification that, unlike the
Dutch book argument, is direct: it is the goal of Bayesian inference
to make inductive inferences about the world, and such infer-
ence is optimal in a well-defined sense, whereby—on average—no
other procedure can do better.
What is true of induction in general, of course, can also be
applied to specific cases. For example, in the context of super-
vised categorization, that is, the task of trying to assign instances,
including novel instances, to the right (pre-existing) category, the
so-called Bayes’ optimal classifier will assign items to categories
in such a way as to minimize the expected error rate, and thus
provides a point of comparison in machine learning contexts (see
e.g., Ripley, 1996)8.
Considering in such detail various strands of justification for
why “being Bayesian” might be viewed as normative or ratio-
nal is important for a number of reasons. Vis a vis a “normative
challenge” such as that by proponents of quantum probability, it
7With the proviso that these possible worlds are finite, a restriction that seems
fine for creatures with finite resources and life spans.
8Consideration of the optimal Bayes classifier also makes clear that the “ratio-
nal” force of Anderson’s (1991) model increases the more one is willing to
view the task of unsupervised categorization as one of discovering underlying,
true categories in nature.
makes clear quite how much is required for such a challenge to
be well-supported. Merely assuming or speculating that human
behavior is rational will never suffice to make it so, and Elqayam
and Evans (2011), in particular, have been right to highlight that
such an inference from “is” (i.e., how people behave) to “ought”
(i.e., how they should behave) would be fallacious [see Elqayam
and Evans (2) above]. However, the normative status of Bayesian
probability does not rest on its descriptive fit to human behav-
ior, but rather on independent arguments such as those just
described.
Furthermore, it is because of these normative foundations,
that Bayes’ theorem, though conceptually simple, is far from con-
ceptually trivial in the way Jones and Love (2011) might be taken
to suggest (3 above). It figures centrally within formal work in
the philosophy of science and within epistemology that is con-
cerned with fundamental questions about information seeking,
evidence, and explanation, and it figures centrally in statistics,
machine learning and artificial intelligence (and that fact, inci-
dentally, adds an interdisciplinary richness to Bayesian models
both at the “blue” and the “green” end). For all these disciplines,
normative questions about how one ought to behave, or how a
problem is best solved, are both theoretically interesting and prac-
tically important. Indeed, the debate about Bayesian models itself
is a debate about what should count as a “good” theory and about
how psychological research “ought” to proceed.
It is thus an interesting question in and of itself how a partic-
ular model or procedure relates to an optimal Bayesian one. As a
consequence, the theoretical interest and explanatory power of a
Bayesian formalization does not rest on whether or not it makes
deviant (and hence unique) predictions from existing psycholog-
ical theories. Contrary to Jones and Love’s critique that Bayesian
models frequently merely recapitulate extant (mechanism level)
theories (2 above) and to Bowers and Davis perception that they
rarely “make better predictions” of human behavior than sim-
pler, non-Bayesian models, there may be added value in “mere
recapitulation” because it is informative with regard to norma-
tive concerns, which in turn opens up the possibility of functional
explanations with regard to why the system is operating the way it
does.
Of course, as outlined earlier in the context of Anderson’s
rational model, the normative force of Bayesian conditionaliza-
tion applies only to the extent that Bayesian inference has a clear
mapping onto the task under which it is a core component.Where
it does, however, viewing a Bayesian formalization and a mech-
anistic model simply as “competitors” partly misses the point.
Furthermore, the normative aspect may give Bayesian formal-
ization a unique role in deriving adequate mechanistic accounts
in the first place, as the final section of this paper will seek
to show.
THE FALSE TENSION BETWEEN MECHANISM, PROCESS
MODELS AND NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS
Running through the critiques of Bayesian modeling that form
the focus of the present paper seems to be a perception that “ratio-
nal” or “normative” considerations are blind to, or even at odds,
with mechanism and process-level concerns; however, it may be
argued that they are, in fact, part of the route to identifying
mechanism or process-level constraints in the first place.
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Specifically, it seems likely that pinning down properly cogni-
tive constraints will require appeal to optimality. As Howes et al.
(2009) have recently argued, the space of possible cognitive the-
ories is massively under-constrained. The notion of cognitively
bounded rational analysis provides a means by which to limit that
search space in ways that other approaches do not allow, thus pro-
viding an essential complement to othermethods. Specifically, the
study of cognition faces the particular difficulty of humans’ inher-
ent flexibility: multiple strategies are typically available for any
given task, and the project of seeking to discern cognitive invari-
ants must distinguish between aspects of behavior that appear
universal because they, in fact, reflect hard constraints within the
system, and those that arise time and again simply because they
reflect selection of an obvious, best strategy.
In light of this difficulty, Howes et al. (2009) demonstrate how
making strategies computationally explicit, determining their
expected pay-offs, and seeking to understand performance rel-
ative to those optimal strategies is fundamental to tackling the
credit-assignment problem between “fundamental cognitive con-
straint” and “strategy selection.”
Such an approach seems at odds with critiques of Jones
and Love (2011), Elqayam and Evans (2011), and Bowers and
Davis (2012a,b). In arguing that process level theories are more
important and should be given precedence or that research
would advance more quickly without normative theories, these
critiques are overlooking the methodological value that stems
from the fact that optimal models (in general) form a privi-
leged class of explanation. It is a reasonable default assumption
that the cognitive system is trying to do something sensible.
Consequently, the fact that a strategy would be optimal supports
a presumptive inference to the fact that it is indeed the strategy
being used and this has been seen as methodologically impor-
tant not just in psychology, but also economics and the social
sciences.
The standard method of economics has been founded on
optimization: Individual agents are presumed to be rational and
it is the goal of economic theorizing to understand aggregate
behaviors that arise from the interactions of such individuals
(see e.g., Lehtinen and Kuorikoski, 2007). Rational choice the-
ory has assumed that economic agents have stable and coherent
preferences as set out by expected utility theory (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern, 1947). This methodological commitment,
though challenged by behavioral economics (see e.g., Thaler and
Mullainathan, 2008), has not only been seen as successful within
economics, but has been exported to adjacent disciplines such as
political science (see e.g., Cox, 1999; Ferejohn, 2002).
Though conceived primarily as a normative theory, expected
utility theory has, at times, been viewed as a descriptive the-
ory within economics (see e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948),
and its normative appeal has been viewed as a prima facie rea-
son for why it might provide a descriptive account (Friedman
and Savage, 1952 see also Starmer, 2005 for critical discussion).
Even now, given overwhelming evidence of violations of ratio-
nal choice theory in both experiments and field studies (see e.g.,
Camerer, 1995), the theories of aggregate behavior arising from
idealized rational agents aim to be descriptively accurate; this
may be possible because certain behavioral contexts provide pres-
sures that lead individuals to utilitymaximizing behavior (see e.g.,
Binmore, 1994; Satz and Ferejohn, 1994) and because the behav-
ior of aggregate systems may be robust to the deviations from
rational choice theory real agents might display (Lehtinen and
Kuorikoski, 2007)9. None of this involves a fallacious ought-to-
is or is-to-ought inference of the kind Elqayam and Evans accuse
“normativism” of [see Elqayam and Evans (2) above]. Such a fal-
lacy would be commited if one thought the world was a particular
way simply because it ought to be, or, conversely, that something
out to be the case simply because it was. However, the expectation
of rational behavior simply thinks it likely that people behave a
certain way because they ought to, not that they necessarily do; at
the same time, what counts as rational does not rest on whether
or not people actually behave the way they should (is-to-ought),
because the normative claim has been independently derived10.
More generally, rational standards provide essential inter-
pretative tools: Any human behavior typically allows many
different interpretations, and this is as relevant to science as
it is to everyday life. In day-to-day life we resolve ambiguity
with “the principle of charity” (e.g., Govier, 1987; see also
Oaksford, 2014). Specifically, given multiple interpretations of
what someone is saying, we pick the interpretation that renders
what they are saying most sensible as our default interpretation.
This interpretation may be wrong, and further evidence will force
us to abandon it. However, the basic fact that there are default
orderings over possible interpretations simplifies massively the
task of understanding. Even without specific knowledge of an
individual we can typically make reasonably accurate predictions
just on the basis of what would be “sensible” (though again, there
is no guarantee that these predictions will be correct).
The principle of charity likewise applies to the formal con-
text of understanding behavior within psychological research (see
also Hahn, 2011). If we observe something counter-intuitive or
surprising, we should as researchers always ask ourselves whether
there is an interpretation of participants’ behavior that might ren-
der it sensible (and hence predictable). Such consideration may
identify discrepancies in the way experimenter and participant
view the task, leading the researcher to revise interpretations of
what it is participants are doing, andmany of the seeming “errors”
and “biases” have been re-evaluated in this way (see e.g., Hilton,
1995).
This is not an attempt to find rationality at any cost; instead,
it is an interpretative strategy that provides an essential method-
ological tool. This is further illustrated by ideal observer analysis
as has been hugely successful in the study of perception (e.g.,
Geisler, 1987). Ideal observer models employ the formal tools
of probability and decision theory to specify a model of optimal
9Again, the very fact that theories based on assumptions of rationality have
come under increasing pressure within economics (both at the individual and
the aggregate level, see e.g., Thaler and Mullainathan, 2008; Fox, 2010) is tes-
timony to the fact that optimal models are falsifiable. At the same time, it is
important to not confuse the fact that an empirical or theoretical assumption
turns out to be wrong, or at some point needs to be replaced in order for a field
to progress further, with the claim that greater insight and more rapid devel-
opment would have been achieved without that assumption (cf. Elqayam and
Evans, 2011; Jones and Love, 2011).
10That said, one may take issue with Elqayam and Evans construal of the rela-
tionship between is and ought in the context of explaining behavior more
generally, see Corner and Hahn, 2013, for discussion.
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performance given the available input for a task. Actual human
performance is then compared to the performance of this ideal
agent. In a process of iterative refinement, human performance
and ideal observer are brought into closer and closer correspon-
dence by incorporating capacity limitations of the human system
into the ideal observer. This approach provides a tool for the
elucidation of mechanism and process, embedded in an over-
all account that seeks to understand the system as “doing the
best it can do” given the available hardware. In so doing, the
approach inherently links behavioral prediction, mechanistic and
functional explanation. In character, it might be viewed as a
methodological formalization of the principle of charity.
Crucially, the aim is not to declare the system “optimal” per se
(see also Griffiths et al., 2012 for related points on Bayesian mod-
eling outside the context of ideal observer analysis). It remains the
case that the (truly) optimal agent will be an ideal observer who
is not subject to the many constraints of the human, physical sys-
tem. So, to the extent that the human system achieves less than
maximal performance, it is not “optimal” in the strongest possi-
ble sense, even if it is doing the best it can. At the same time, in
the limit, a model that embodies all the constraints of the human
system under scrutiny will just be that system. This means that, as
a theoretical statement, it becomes increasingly vacuous to label
a system as “optimal” (even in a weaker sense) as more and more
constraints are built into the optimal agent to match its behavior
(see also Jarvstad et al., 2014).
Instead, the point of the approach is a methodological one:
rational models aide the disambiguation between competing the-
ories and assist in the identification of underlying cognitive
universals above and beyond the demand characteristics of exper-
imental tasks (Howes et al., 2009). Once again, this gives such
models and considerations a special status, above and beyond
degrees of “model-fit” and so on.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
It has been argued in this paper that recent critiques of Bayesian
modeling, and even more general critiques of computational
level theories centered around normative considerations, are mis-
directed and misjudged. Specific examples have been used to
counter any claim that Bayesian modeling would be inherently
too flexible and thus unfalsifiable: not just the long-standing
literature on judgment and decision-making, but more recent
work within the context of reasoning and argumentation (e.g.,
Harris et al., 2012) provide ready examples of parameter-free
model fits, where the model itself consists simply of Bayes’
theorem.
It has also been claimed that for the development of “good”
cognitive models other constraints (process level, or mechanism
level) may bemore important; against this, it has been highlighted
that in many domains (in particular high-level domains such
as reasoning or argumentation) the task participants face is one
defined by inferential relationships between information states,
and that an account that is based on those informational relation-
ships is thus likely to explain most of the variance in behavioral
prediction. That said, Bayesian accounts have been remarkably
successful even in areas, such as perception (e.g., Knill and
Richards, 1996; Yuille and Kersten, 2006), where mechanism can
reasonably be expected to play a key role. Moreover, in many such
domains, ideal observer analysis plays a valuable methodologi-
cal role in identifying and understanding mechanistic constraints
(Geisler, 1987). Hence the conflict between “mechanism” or “pro-
cess” and rational explanation is methodologically ill-conceived.
Pinning down processing constraints is likely to actually require
appeal to optimality (see also, Howes et al., 2009).
At the same time, the present paper has given examples
from within the reasoning and argumentation literature whereby
Bayesian accounts, focussed on normative considerations, have
demonstrably increased the level of behavioral prediction relative
to that previously available in the relevant domain of research,
and have provided analyses that open up (and first make possible)
entirely new empirical programmes (a far cry from the accusation
of merely recapitulating extant process/mechanism models). In
all of this, this paper has sought to clarify why normative con-
siderations (or considerations of “rationality” or “optimality”)
are theoretically interesting and methodologically important over
and above behavioral prediction, potentially making a Bayesian
model more than just another one of many competitors.
For any, or even all, of the examples used in setting out these
arguments, the authors of the original critiques under scrutiny
might wish to respond “but those are not the models I had
in mind!.” Certainly, Jones and Love (2011) claim only that
Bayesian models frequently or maybe even typically exhibit some
of the negative traits they perceive. Likewise, Bowers and Davis
(2012a,b) supply a wealth of examples in making their case. The
point of the present paper, however, is not to argue about whether
or not certain perceptions are fair characterizations of the models
that the authors of these critiques might have had in mind. Rather
the point is to make the case that even if they were, the perceived
limitations do not stem from the models being Bayesian. There
could be a model or even many models for which some or all
of the critiques examined here were apt and fair. However, the
existence of examples to which the critiques do not apply indi-
cates that it is not the formalism or Bayesian framework per se
that would be to blame for any such inadequacy. Rather the fault
would lie with the framework’s particular application.
This matters because it constrains the debate about models.
Whether typical or not, the examples chosen in this paper demon-
strate that “Bayesian models” is the wrong level of generality at
which to pitch these critiques. Onemay dislike specific models (or
maybe even the models generally put forward by a specific mod-
eler) and it will always be entirely proper to have debate about
what supposedly makes a specific model “bad.” But in order to
best advance the quality of the models we as a discipline produce,
such debate will need to be considerably more specific than the
general critiques of Bayesian modeling examined here.
To some extent, all three of the critiques surveyed may
be taken to agree with this, because each has sought to
draw distinctions between types of Bayesian modeling [Jones
and Love between “Bayesian Fundamentalism and Bayesian
Enlightenment,” Bowers and Davis between “Theoretical and
Methodological Bayesianism,” and Elqayam and Evans (2013)
between “strict and soft Bayesianism”]. However, those distinc-
tions themselves are motivated by the perceptions/claims that
have been scrutinized in this paper. To the extent that these claims
have been rejected, further classifications (and recommendations
depending on them) are rejected also.
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Cognitive modeling, however, does need more than debate
about specific models. It arguably needs general debate about
what exactly makes a model good, and the entire discipline
arguably needs a better understanding of what, in general, makes
explanation or theories “good” (for critiques of the state of psy-
chological theorizing see e.g., Gigerenzer, 2009). It seems likely
that the critiques by Jones and Love (2011), Bowers and Davis
(2012a,b), and Elqayam and Evans (2011) evaluated here were
motivated in part by disagreement about what aspects are most
valuable in a cognitive model or theory. What those aspects
should be and what kinds of theories and explanations we should
strive for is a pressing issue. It is of great value if the critiques
examined have started such debate.
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